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[1] Chapter Six 
 
Digital Radio Strategies in the United States:  A Tale of Two Systems 
 
Alan G. Stavitsky 
 
Michael W. Huntsberger  
 
 
The case of digital radio in North America illuminates the contradiction between federal 
communication policy ideals and realpolitik.  The policy of the United States government 
gives official imprimatur to robust competition and to local broadcasting that serves ‘the 
public interest, convenience or necessity,’ in the words of the federal licensing standard 
(Radio Act of 1927).  In the decades since the passage of the Federal Radio Act, notions 
of capitalism and communication have intertwined as they have been set down in the re-
conceptions and revisions of the original statute. Within the local marketplace, the theory 
goes that unfettered capitalism will lead to efficient exchange of goods and services, 
while free and open discourse will yield the best ideas to promote the democratic process 
(Stavitsky 1994).  On the foundation of this theoretical model, broadcast stations in the 
United States have always been licensed at the level of the local community.  To ensure 
competition, regulators have historically set and enforced limits on the number of stations 
any individual or agency could own. 
 
Broadcast regulation in the United States, however, has long been marked by tension 
between the ideals of localism and competition, and the lure of centralization. While 
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national broadcasting systems dominated the development of European radio, U.S. radio 
began in the early 1920s with independent local stations drawing upon local voices. The 
rhetoric of the time reflected utopian notions of radio as a conduit of civic discourse 
through which citizens would deliberate the public affairs of the community. In practice, 
however, network broadcasting developed rapidly and the ‘chains’, as the first national 
broadcasting corporations were originally known, became the dominant source of 
programming within radio’s formative first decade. In addition to this centralization of 
content, control of stations became increasingly concentrated as broadcasters successfully 
lobbied for gradual relaxation of ownership limits. For radio, this deregulatory trend 
culminated in passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which eliminated all 
restrictions on national ownership, while retaining limits within any particular market 
(Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
 
This capsule history points to the ambiguity of U.S. communication policy. The focus of 
regulation remains on local service, while content and control are largely centralized.  
Though the metaphor of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ implies robust competition, ownership 
has been allowed to concentrate. Further, the Federal Communications Commission, 
while seeking to bring the benefits of new technology to industry and public, has 
historically been reluctant to set technological standards, preferring to let the market 
decide. At times this lack of symmetry between regulators and industry has had 
significant consequences. The commission’s failure to set standards for AM stereo 
systems in the 1980s helped doom the technology to irrelevance (Sterling and Kittross 
2002: 570).  Similar ambiguities have characterized the emergence of digital radio, as 
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U.S. regulators have been unprepared or unwilling to face the challenges presented by 
new technologies, and have consistently deferred to industrial imperatives as they 
established a policy framework. 
 
[2] Stumbling toward a digital radio standard 
Initiatives to migrate broadcast radio in the United States from analogue to digital 
systems began in the early 1980s, concurrent with similar efforts in Europe and Asia.  
With the introduction of audio compact disc players to the consumer market in 1982, 
U.S. broadcasters sought methods to upgrade the audio quality of their services in order 
to provide CD-quality sound (Radio World 2008).  Broadcast transmission and reception 
systems of the time were inadequate for the task, leading to a variety of experimental 
approaches to ‘going digital’.  To accommodate the additional bandwidth necessary for 
digital encoding and transmission, Boston public radio station WGBH experimented with 
modulating a digitized audio programme stream on the licensee’s UHF public television 
channel.  While the experiment was considered successful, the broadcasts were available 
to an audience of perhaps a few hundred people who owned professional digital audio 
processors.  WGBH was also among the first to use digital systems to distribute 
programme material between remote and head-end facilities (Bunce 1986: 21). 
 
During this period of digital experimentation, the historic regulatory structures and 
policies that had governed U.S. broadcasting since the 1930s were undergoing 
fundamental and profound change.  With the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan 
and the subsequent appointment of Mark Fowler as chair of the Federal Communications 
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Commission in 1981, broadcasting licenses that had been rigorously regulated by the 
F.C.C. became commodities that could be easily traded on the open market. Widely 
credited for referring to television as ‘a toaster with pictures’, Fowler de-emphasized the 
Commission’s policy research and recommendation functions in favour of market-based 
solutions derived from the practices of industry (Boyer 1987: C15).  Notable for 
decisions that eliminated requirements for public service programming, lowered 
standards for license renewal and removed restrictions on the sale of licenses, the F.C.C. 
under Fowler nurtured an environment that encouraged private interests to take the lead 
in the development of digital broadcasting in the United States. 
 
The challenge emerged in 1990, as the F.C.C. considered whether to authorize both 
terrestrial and satellite-delivered digital radio services. Somewhat surprisingly, the first 
initiative to come before the Commission did not originate with one of the major U.S. 
broadcasting companies or equipment manufacturers, but from a start-up:  Satellite CD 
Radio Inc. petitioned the F.C.C. to allocate space in the S-band between 12.2 and 12.7 
GHz for the transmission of signals to geostationary earth-orbiting satellites capable of 
transmitting a nationwide, multi-channel digital audio service directly to consumers. The 
Satellite Digital Audio Radio System [S-DARs] – satellite radio – would be available 
throughout the continental United States, allowing the consumer to travel coast to coast 
without experiencing interference or service interruptions (Huntsberger 2001). Charging 
that the Satellite CD plan threatened the local service of 12,000 terrestrial radio 
broadcasters, the National Association of Broadcasters asked to F.C.C. to dismiss the 
application.  At the time, the president of Satellite CD observed that the commercial 
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broadcasters were not motivated by aspirations to preserve the traditions of local service 
or the public interest, but rather by the more essential desire to restrict competition (New 
York Times 1990: D4). 
 
On behalf of its members, the vast majority of whom are commercial enterprises, the 
N.A.B. considered a variety of systems that could be capable of providing CD-quality 
digital audio broadcast services, including delivery by cable, satellite, and terrestrial 
channels. As the World Administrative Radio Conference moved toward adoption of the 
DAB system, the N.A.B. was pushing for the adoption of the Eureka 147 system as the 
U.S. standard (New York Times 1991: 115). But L-band DAB faced a host of challenges.  
Because Eureka 147 was suitable for terrestrial and satellite transmission, existing 
broadcasters feared that the technology might provide parity for S-DARS. In addition, 
broadcasters viewed the multiplex capability of Eureka 147 as an opportunity for new 
terrestrial competition, and worried that Eureka 147 allocations might not match existing 
coverage.i Public agencies had other concerns. Following the success of Operation Desert 
Storm, a coalition of forces in the administration of George H.W. Bush moved to protect 
the L-band for the use by the U.S. Department of Defense for ‘aeronautical flight-test 
telemetry’ for the development of new, advanced weapons systems (Belsie 1992: 9). 
 
As the debate over spectrum allocation and transmission standards proceeded, an 
initiative developed jointly by commercial ownership groups CBS Radio, the Gannett 
Company and Group W Broadcasting proposed a system that would allow for 
simultaneous transmission of analogue and digital signals on existing FM frequencies, 
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and possibly on AM channels as well. Such an in-band on-channel [IBOC] system 
offered the possibility that the move from analogue to digital technology could be 
accomplished without any dislocation to the existing marketplace for broadcast radio 
programming and advertising. Specifically, the IBOC system promised existing licensees 
the chance to enhance the sound of their broadcasts and carry additional services on their 
signals without opening channels for new competitors. But it would not be easy: one CBS 
executive compared the challenge to ‘fishing out millions of needles every second from 
an endless line of haystacks’ (Andrews 1992: D8). 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the N.A.B. considered several approaches to IBOC digital radio.  
But the primary policy agenda for commercial radio broadcasters was characterized by 
their united and vocal opposition to satellite radio.  At every turn, the N.A.B. asserted the 
position that nationwide satellite services would undermine the ability of local 
broadcasters to ‘attract listeners, sell advertising and maintain their viability’ (Andrews 
1992: D1).  While engineering trials for satellite broadcasting proceeded smoothly, the 
progress of satellite radio in the sphere of public policy slowed to an almost glacial pace.  
The F.C.C. asserted that ‘existing radio broadcasters can and should have the opportunity 
to take advantage of new digital radio technologies’, and acknowledged industry 
concerns that the national footprint of satellite radio posed a competitive threat to local 
stations, reaffirming localism as a ‘touchstone value’ (F.C.C. 1999: 4). At the same time, 
while recognizing the terrestrial and satellite services ‘would compete to some extent’, 
the Commission concluded that satellite radio would complement broadcast radio ‘by 
providing regional and national services’, and that IBOC DAB was not yet technically 
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feasible. Backed by arguments for technology advancement and market diversity, the 
proponents of satellite radio ultimately succeeded, convincing the F.C.C. to allocate 
spectrum and consider license applications from four private companies (Andrews 1995: 
D14). Two of these companies survived as XM Radio, launched in November 2001, and 
Sirius Satellite Radio, launched in 2002 – the dramatic launches garnering considerable 
attention from the press and investors on Wall Street. Though they were separate and 
competing companies, the fates of the two digital services would remain connected.  
 
Faced with the realities of competition, the N.A.B. moved ahead with efforts to develop a 
workable IBOC system. It would be nearly four years until the CBS-Gannett partnership, 
operating as USA Digital Radio, filed the first Petition for Rulemaking with the F.C.C. to 
permit IBOC as the terrestrial digital radio broadcast standard in the U.S (Desposito 
1999: 45), and another three years before the Commission approved an IBOC system for 
use in the United States (Feder 2002: C3). While IBOC on the FM band received the 
approval of the National Radio Systems Committee, the influential engineering group 
could not endorse similar technology for AM broadcasting, citing night-time interference 
problems. Because one of the selling points of IBOC had been improved fidelity for AM 
broadcasters on a par with FM-band signals, any strategy that might move forward with 
FM-IBOC only was questionable. Nevertheless, IBOC was presented to broadcasters 
with great fanfare at the 2002 NAB convention as a fully operational system and 
approved by the F.C.C. later that year, despite AM transmission problems and a lack of 
testing with consumer receivers.   
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Significantly, the Commission’s decision did not include a calendar mandate for digital 
conversion. With a tip of the hat to former Chairman Fowler’s bedrock belief in the 
power of free markets, regulators followed the preferences of industry leaders and turned 
to the forces of supply and demand to catalyze the adoption of digital radio in the U.S.  
The approved IBOC system would be manufactured and distributed exclusively by 
iBiquity Digital, and available only under license from the manufacturer. The rush to 
market was driven by a desire to reassure Wall Street of the continued viability of 
terrestrial radio in the digital age, even as satellite radio systems and services began to 
appear in the consumer market (Ala-Fossi and Stavitsky: 2003).   
 
As commercial radio interests took more than a decade to roll out their chosen digital 
system, a variety of chipmakers and equipment manufactures capitalized on the slow, 
deliberate pace of IBOC development. Motorola, Blaupunkt and Texas Instruments were 
among the companies that developed technologies for digitizing, filtering and 
manipulating analogue radio signals to improve reception and audio quality (Feder 2002: 
C2). The public release of the World Wide Web allowed stations to deliver digitally-
encoded audio programming directly to personal computers, and created a global delivery 
platform for audio content and services. Software designers developed algorithms that 
reduced the size of digital audio data files so they could be economically captured, 
manipulated, stored and retrieved by personal computers, without apparent loss of sound 
quality. By 2001, when Apple released the iPod portable player and the iTunes software 
that allowed consumers to easily select, purchase, store, and replay thousands of digitally 
encoded songs on demand, the consumer market for audio media had entirely outstripped 
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the scenarios envisioned by U.S. commercial broadcasters, and the N.A.B. Satellite radio 
had become just one of a host of digital audio technologies and services competing with 
terrestrial radio for the attention of American consumers. 
 
The symbiosis of the terrestrial and satellite digital systems re-emerged with the 2008 
merger of XM and Sirius into a single, corporate entity. When the F.C.C. issued the 
original licenses to the two companies, it did so with the stipulation that one company 
would not be permitted to acquire control of the other. This stipulation was intended to 
ensure competition and mollify terrestrial broadcasters, but once the business plans of the 
two companies were set into motion, both satellite providers saw their operating costs 
soar like their respective launch vehicles, and eventually Sirius and XM sought 
government approval to merge in 2006. This led to eighteen months of official 
deliberation by the U.S. Justice Department which considers anti-trust matters. At issue 
was the definition of market; were XM and Sirius in effect competing with local radio 
stations, transmitting from 25,000 miles up? Viewed in this way, a satellite radio 
monopoly could create a formidable challenge that threatened the economic viability of 
local terrestrial broadcasters and, by extension, the bedrock value of localism. 
 
But Sirius and XM argued that satellite radio is simply another aural alternative in an 
audio marketplace that includes not just terrestrial radio, but also Internet audio services, 
iPods and other digital players, and audio-enabled cell phones. The Justice Department, 
and eventually the F.C.C., took the latter view, ruling that the merger would not hurt 
competition. ‘In several important segments of their business, with or without the merger, 
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the parties simply do not compete today,’ said Thomas O. Barnett, head of the Justice 
Department’s anti-trust division. ‘Some people may view iPods as a particularly good 
alternative. They may view HD radio as an alternative’ (quoted in Philip Shenon, 
3/25/08, NYT, Justice Dept Approves XM Merger with Sirius).  As Sirius and XM move 
to combine their operations, sales, marketing and customer service functions, the short-
term benefits of the merger will accrue first to the business enterprises. For consumers, 
the full value of a combined service and its competitive impact on the market, will not be 
apparent until receivers capable of picking up both satellite services become available, 
perhaps in the next year (Pizzi 2008: 42). 
 
[2] Playing catch-up 
Given the long road to IBOC implementation, U.S. radio broadcasters have moved 
relatively quickly to bring the technology to market and stimulate consumer interest.  
Capitalizing on burgeoning interest in the federally mandated conversion to High 
Definition Television [HDTV], iBiquity rechristened the IBOC system as HD Radio.ii  
By October 2003, 280 stations in more than 100 markets had purchased licenses for HD 
Radio technology, and but only 70 were broadcasting digitally encoded FM signals 
(Berger 2003: G3; iBiquity 2003).  HD Radio-capable home receivers appeared at the 
2004 Consumer Electronics Show, and several automobile manufacturers carried HD 
Radio receivers in their 2004 models. But consumer interest was marginal at best. The 
receivers were expensive:  Kenwood’s KTC-HR100 add-on tuner for car stereos carried a 
price tag of $350 (Berger), far more than add-on units for satellite radio, and a substantial 
price to pay for CD-quality audio in the listening environment of a moving car with an 
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80+ dB noise floor. HD receivers designed for home use entered the market with retail 
prices of $500 or more (Fleishman 2005: C11). More recently, prices for home and auto 
receivers have moderated, with some units now costing less than $100 (iBiquity 2009).  
However, power requirements for HD chips exceed specifications appropriate for 
personal devices, and no manufacturer currently offers a portable HD unit that can 
complement or compete with Apple’s iPod and similar digital players, shutting HD 
broadcasters out of this most significant market. 
 
Faced with such challenges, in 2005 some of the largest commercial radio companies in 
the U.S., including Clear Channel Radio, Entercom and Infinity Broadcasting, formed the 
HD Digital Radio Alliance, a co-ordinated, national strategic marketing campaign to 
‘accelerate the rollout of HD Digital Radio’ (HD Digital Radio Alliance 2005). 
Paradoxically, the campaign was undertaken at a political level in the name of protecting 
the U.S. ideal of locally focused and controlled radio stations, despite criticism that the 
consortium violates anti-trust law. The strategy of the Alliance positioned HD in 
opposition to satellite radio, offering a parallel benefit – programme diversity – without 
the cost of a satellite radio subscription. Beginning with radio spot advertising on 280 
stations in 28 markets, valued at $200 million, the campaign touts the benefits of HD to 
listeners, and promoted the availability of receivers for new and existing cars and homes 
(HD Alliance 2006). The effort provides broadcasters with logos, brochures, print ads, 
web banners and other graphic materials, an audio podcast, a video with tips for 
consumers, and links to rebate offers from HD radio manufacturers and dealers (HD 
Alliance 2009).  
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While the Alliance touts the efficacy of these efforts, a 2007 study by independent 
research firm Bridge Ratings concludes that market penetration by HD radio lags far 
behind competing technologies, especially analogue AM and FM radio, which continues 
to serve over 90% of Americans each week. iPods and other digital players reach 30% of 
the population, and satellite radio penetrates almost 5%. In comparison, HD Radio 
reaches less than 1% of Americans:  Bridge estimates that 450,000 Americans listen to 
HD radio every week, compared to 57 million that listen to some form of Internet radio 
(Bridge Ratings 2007).  One analyst asserts that the steady, deliberate promotional 
strategy of the Alliance is ‘difficult to support’. Such a long-term, continuous campaign 
is perhaps the hardest type of promotional exercise to undertake successfully, as opposed 
to the sort of short-term, high-visibility strategies that are preferred by marketing 
professionals (Pizzi 2008: 15). These developments suggest that HD radio has a long way 
to go to catch up with other digital audio technologies available in the U.S. 
 
U.S. public radio broadcasters have focused primarily on the feasibility of using the 
secondary audio channels [SACS] on HD Radio signals to provide additional programme 
services to niche audiences. Throughout 2003, field tests conducted by NPR Labs 
examined the performance of HD channels carrying two programme streams. The 
findings of the Tomorrow Radio Project demonstrated that spectrum split into two 
streams was sufficiently robust to provide high-quality reception in mobile environments 
(NPR Labs 2004).  In subsequent years, NPR Labs has become a leader in HD Radio 
research, publishing findings on coverage and interference.  
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Digitization also offers the promise of new public-service applications. Many public 
radio stations use their analogue sidebands to broadcast programmes for visually 
impaired listeners, but these ‘radio reading services’ require distribution of specially 
equipped receivers. HD Radio accommodates these services on multicast side channels 
(though this does by necessity still require listeners to obtain a digital receiver). Further, 
NPR Labs, the research-and-development wing of National Public Radio, collaborated 
with Harris Corporation, a U.S. communication equipment manufacturer, and Towson 
University engineers to develop an audio-captioning system that does, in effect, subtitle 
radio programming for hearing-impaired people (CITE). The system was demonstrated in 
live coverage of the U.S. presidential election returns in November 2008 (‘Captioned 
radio broadcast to enable millions of deaf and hard-of-hearing to experience NPR’s live 
coverage of presidential election for the first time,’ 21 October 2008, news release, 
International Center for Accessible Radio Technology, http://I-cart.net). 
 
[2] International concerns 
Presently, no nation or governing body beyond the United States has considered HD 
Radio as a standard for digital broadcasting. Yet the nation’s position as a dominant 
economic and political power, and one of the world’s largest markets for broadcasting 
technology for consumers and professionals, presents considerable challenges and 
opportunities for other digital radio interests around the world. In addition, the U.S. 
shares two borders; one with Canada totaling almost 9,000 kilometres, and one with 
Mexico of just over 3,000 kilometres. This shared geography poses a number of issues 
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related to spectrum allocation, cross-border interference, and the availability of services 
and equipment in professional and consumer markets. 
 
 For many years, Canada embraced the Eureka 147 DAB standard for the transition to 
digital radio broadcasting.  But a 2006 report on the future of broadcasting in Canada 
recognized that analogue FM remained a dominant form of radio, and that Canadian 
broadcasters have ‘adopted new technology platforms through Internet streaming and 
podcasting, as well as entering into content partnership arrangements with other 
undertakings including satellite providers’, particularly those based in the U.S. (O’Neill 
2008: 32). Recognizing the new realities in the digital audio marketplace, the Canadian 
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission revised the nation’s digital radio 
policy to consider DAB as one of a number of appropriate technologies, including HD 
Radio that might be adopted in Canada. The CRTC also announced it was prepared to 
authorize IBOC services in Canada (Radio 2006). Field trials conducted in Toronto in 
2007 concluded that the technology poses interference problems for existing analogue 
FM services, and that implementation will have to be accompanied by review and 
revision of spectrum management rules (Bouchard 2007). Mirroring the U.S. experience, 
the Bouchard report observes that consumers will ultimately decide whether HD services 
will be viable in Canada. To date, no agency has applied for authority to test or adopt HD 
Radio for any location in Canada. 
 
More recently, the Federal Telecommunications Commission of Mexico authorized HD 
Radio transmission within 320 miles of the U.S. border.  Recognizing ‘the extent of the 
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development and implementation of the IBOC system’ in the U.S., COFETEL elected to 
forego further research and field trials in advance, taking ‘decisive action’ to bring HD 
Radio to listeners in northern Mexico (Radio 2008).  Mexican regulators directed stations 
interested in HD transmission to request authorization and assist with assessments of the 
technology. Conveniently for American broadcasters, the 320 km limit accommodates the 
signals of stations broadcasting from San Diego, Tucson, El Paso and other metropolitan 
areas along the border.  
 
[2] Social implications: Radio’s ‘third chance’? 
The British broadcaster Charles A. Siepman, who was called upon by the F.C.C. to write 
the well-regarded (but ultimately ignored) Blue Book on public service in American 
broadcasting, referred to the development of FM broadcasting in the 1940s as ‘radio’s 
second chance’. He wrote of the social potential of FM to redeem radio’s promise after 
the AM band became awash in mass entertainment and advertising (Siepman 1946).  If 
FM represented radio’s second chance, might the digital transition constitute the 
medium’s third chance? 
 
It’s clear that digital radio offers some of the same advantages noted by Siepman in the 
case of FM – additional channels of communication through multicasting, and improved 
audio quality. Satellite providers tout the availability of scores of channels, more than 
170 on XM and more than 130 on Sirius (some channels were heard on both services 
after the merger). ‘Everything worth listening to is now on Sirius,’ reads the corporate 
slogan (www.sirius.com). Talk programming crosses the political spectrum, from the 
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Sirius Left channel of liberal content, to Sirius Patriot, a conservative outlet.  Like oldies 
music?  XM offers separate channels for each decade from the 1940s through the 1990s, 
as well as broadcasts of the Super Bowl in 10 languages, including Flemish, Hungarian 
and Mandarin Chinese (www.xmradio.com).  
 
HD Radio, while offering fewer channels because of technical limitations, nonetheless 
seeks to provide programme alternatives beyond the usual broadcast fare. In Portland, 
Oregon, for example, the 23rd-largest radio market in the U.S., fourteen broadcasters were 
multicasting secondary channels at this writing. Formats included blues, comedy and all 
Northwest rock bands (www.ibiquity.com), none of which would generally be considered 
commercially viable in a traditional analogue model. 
 
In addition to programme diversity, digital transmission of course offers the enhancement 
of connectivity to the digital realm, of radio as gateway to web access and data services. 
Digital receivers can display song titles, news headlines and weather or traffic alerts, as 
well as interactivity with advertising. The commercial possibilities – such as the instant 
ability to push a button and buy a download of a song being played, or a product being 
advertised – makes digital transmission attractive to marketers. And, given the growing 
diffusion of third-generation mobile phones, software engineers have designed 
applications to allow users to listen to web streams of radio on their so-called ‘smart 
phones’ (Everhart 2009).  
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Do the potential programming, access and service benefits of digital radio, however, 
align with the ‘touchstone value’ of localism? In theory, the ‘digital plenty’ could allow 
for hyper-local, multicast channels that serve targeted geographic or ethnic communities. 
In practice, however, the early returns point to narrowcasting on secondary IBOC 
channels defined in terms of musical taste, such as the ‘indie-rock’ channels starting to 
proliferate on HD radio. Of course, satellite radio, as a national service, primarily 
construes ‘localism’ in terms of genre tastes, with the occasional exception of imagined 
communities such as the gay and lesbian audience served by Sirius’ OutQ channel 
(www.sirius.com/outq). 
 
[2] Supervening social necessity? 
While regulators and industry leaders invested years of energy and millions of dollars in 
competing digital radio systems, consumers have remained largely unimpressed. 
Presented with a variety of digital audio systems, the public has gravitated to iPods, smart 
phones and Internet audio, as indicated in the Bridge Ratings study. This reflects 
Winston’s notion that there must be ‘supervening social necessity’ if a technological 
innovation is to be widely diffused (Winston 1998). Put simply, the innovation must 
serve some social need if it is to succeed; a commercial purpose alone is not necessarily 
sufficient. The rapid acceptance of early radio can be linked to satisfying the 
entertainment and information needs of a dispersed and growing population, as well as 
commercial needs for mass marketing (Lax 2003).  
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In contrast, where is the consumer demand for digital radio in the U.S.? What is the 
‘killer application’?  Data from the Project for Excellence in Journalism indicates that the 
number of broadcasters switching to HD Radio peaked at in 2006 at 522 stations – the 
year HD became available to the public.  The number of new HD stations fell 25 per cent 
to 394 in 2007 (Radio 2008).  While the data may reflect reluctance on the part of 
terrestrial station owners to shoulder the burden of conversion in the present difficult 
economic circumstances, the downward trend may also indicate that HD Radio has 
passed the peak in the bell curve of technology adoption described by Rogers (2003: 
273).  The PEJ study sees clouds on the horizon for satellite radio as well: public 
awareness of satellite radio has leveled off considerably since 2006 at about 60%.  
Interest in satellite radio remains flat as well, with only 3% responding that they are ‘very 
likely’ to subscribe in the next 12 months. Concurrently, 44% said cell phones are having 
‘a big impact on their lives’, and today’s smart phones are capable of receiving Internet 
streaming audio (including the streams of XM and Sirius), and analogue radio – but not 
HD Radio. In summary, it seems that analogue broadcast radio remains ubiquitous in the 
U.S., and hundreds of millions of receivers will work just fine for the vast majority of 
listeners for the foreseeable future.       
 
What Levy wrote in the context of European digitization applies in the U.S. case: 
‘Technological change tended more often to lead to minor reforms of existing 
institutional structures…than to be used as an opportunity for a radical overhaul of either 
these institutions or hitherto shared policy objectives’ (1999: 122).  The lack of 
supervening social necessity, coupled with the absence of a government mandate to go 
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digital (as in the case of television), crippled the dual system approach promoted by 
industry and regulators.  Instead, consumers wearing ear buds are driving the ‘radical 
overhaul’.  
 
 
 
References  
Ala-Fossi, M., S. Lax, B. O’Neill, P. Jauert and H. Shaw (2008), ‘The future of radio is 
still digital - but which one?  Expert perspectives and future scenarios for radio media in 
2015’, Journal of Radio and Audio Media, 15:1, May 2008, pp. 5-25. 
Ala-Fossi, Marko and Alan G. Stavitsky (2003), ‘Understanding IBOC: Digital 
technology for analog economics’, Journal of Radio Studies, 10, pp. 63-79. 
Andrews, E. L. (1992), ‘Digital radio: Static is only between owners’,  New York Times, 
6 May, p.D8. 
Andrews, E. L. (1992), ‘F.C.C. plan for radio by satellite’, New York Times, 8 October, 
pp. D1, D17. 
Andrews, E. L. (1995), ‘F.C.C. backs digital satellite radio’,  New York Times, 13 
January, p. D14. 
Belsie, L. (1992), ‘Digital audio broadcasting plays to global audience’, Christian 
Science Monitor, 9 March, p. 9. 
Berger, I. (2003), ‘AM and FM play digital catch-up’, New York Times, 25 December, p. 
G3. 
 20 
Bouchard, G. (2007), ‘HD radio technology trial in Canada’, CBC Technology Review, 4, 
pp.1-11, http://www.cbc.radio-canada.ca/technologyreview/pdf/issue4-trial.pdf. Accessed 
26 January  2009. 
Boyer, P. J. (1987), ‘Under Fowler, F.C.C. treated TV as commerce’, New York Times, 
19 January, p. C15. 
Bridge Ratings (2007), ‘Competitive media usage overview and update’, Bridge Ratings 
Press release, 23 May 2007, 
http://www.bridgeratings.com/press.05.23.07.CompMediaUse.htm. Accessed 26 January 
2009. 
Bunce, A. (1986), ‘“Digital audio” enhances radio sound and silence’, Christian Science 
Monitor, 16 September, p. 21. 
Desposito, J. (1999), ‘IBOC proponents face final hurdle in quest for CD-quality 
broadcasts’, Electronic Design, 47: 17, pp. 45-52. 
Everhart, Karen (2009), ‘Spare-time coder adds another way to hear NPR news on your 
cell phone’, Current, 12 January, pp. 1, 8. 
Feder, B. J. (2002), ‘As digital radio stumbles, new products fill the gap’, New York 
Times, 30 September, p. C2. 
Feder, B. J. (2002), ‘F.C.C. approves digital radio technology’, New York Times, 11 
October, p. C3. 
Federal Communications Commission (1999), ‘In the matter of digital audio broadcasting 
systems and their impact on the terrestrial radio broadcast service’, MM Docket No. 99-
325, FCC 99-327, http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/tcom1996.pdf . 
 21 
  
Fleishman, G. (2005), ‘Revolution on the radio’, New York Times, 28 July, p. C11, 
http://www.jstor.org/action/emailSingleCitation?from=true&singleCitation=true . 
Accessed 9 February 2009. 
HD Digital Radio Alliance (2005), ‘Unprecedented radio-industry alliance will advance 
rollout of HD digital radio’, Press release, 6 December 2005, 
http://www.hdradio.com/press_room.php?newscontent=16. Accessed 31 January 2009. 
HD Digital Radio Alliance (2006), ‘Radio companies kick off first phase of $200 million 
ad campaign for HD digital radio’, Press release, 21 February 2006, 
http://www.hdradio.com/press_room.php?newscontent=23. Accessed 31 January 2009. 
HD Digital Radio Alliance (2009), ‘HD radio marketing toolkit’, 
http://www.hdradioalliance.com/marketing_tool_kit.php. Accessed 31 January 2009. 
HD Radio Alliance (2009), ‘HD Radio - It’s time to upgrade!’, 
http://www.hdradio.com/find_an_hd_digital_radio_station.php. Accessed 27 January  
2009. 
Huntsberger, M. (2001), Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service: Fundamental information 
on S-DARS, Olympia, WA: Media and Communications Consulting. 
iBiquity Digital (2003), ‘280+ stations in over 100 markets set to begin HD radio 
broadcasting’, HD Radio Press release, 1 October 2003,  
http://www.ibiquity.com/press_room/news_releases/2003/83. Accessed 30 January 2009. 
iBiquity Digital (2009), ‘New buyer’s guide’, HD Radio, 
http://www.hdradio.com/buyers_guide.php. Accessed 30 January 2009. 
 22 
iBiquity Digital (2009), ‘Trademarks’, http://www.ibiquity.com/about_us/trademarks. 
Accessed 30 January 2009. 
International Center for Accessible Radio Technology (2008), ‘Captioned radio broadcast 
to enable millions of deaf and hard-of-hearing to experience NPR’s live coverage of 
presidential election for the first time’, News release, 21 October 2008, http://I-cart.net. 
Lawhorn, J. (2003), ‘NPR initiates Tomorrow Radio Project’, 
http://www.npr.org/about/press/030110.tomorrowradio.html. Accessed 27 January 2009. 
Lax, Stephen (2003), ‘The prospects for digital radio: Policy and technology for a new 
broadcasting system’, Information, communication and society, 6, pp. 326-349. 
Levy, David A. (1998), Europe’s digital revolution: Broadcasting regulation, the EU, 
and the nation state, London: Routledge. 
New York Times (1990), ‘A dispute over radio technology’, New York Times, 23 August 
1990, p. D4. 
New York Times (1991), ‘Turf trouble in a digital day’, New York Times, 2 June 1991, p. 
115. 
NPR Labs (2004), ‘Tomorrow Radio Project announces stellar test results, declares 
victory in multi-channel HD radio research’, Press release, 9 January 2004, 
http://www.npr.org/about/press/040109.tomorrowradio.html. Accessed 31 January 2009. 
O’Neill, B. (2008), ‘Digital radio policy in Canada: From analog replacement to 
multimedia convergence’, Journal of Radio and Audio Media, 15:1, pp. 26-40. 
Pizzi, S. (2008), ‘Get ready for the new marketplace’,  Radio World, 32: 23, p. 42. 
 23 
Pizzi, S. (2008), ‘When evolution just isn’t enough’, Radio World, 32: 18, pp. 14-15. 
Radio (2006), ‘Canada rules to allow HD radio’, Radio: The Radio Technology Leader, 
27 December 2006, http://radiomagonline.com/digital_radio/eye_iboc/canada-allow-hd-
radio/index.html. Accessed 31 January 2009. 
Radio (2008), ‘Mexico authorizes HD radio within 320 km of U.S. border’, Radio: The 
Radio Technology Leader, 21 May 2008, http://radiomagonline.com/currents/mexico-hd-
radio-us-border-0521/index.html. Accessed 26 January 2009. 
Radio Act of 1927 (1927), Columbia Law Review, 27:6, pp.726-733.  
Radio World (2008), ‘When do we stop calling it new media?’, Radio World, 32: 19, 
p.46. 
Rogers, Everett M.  (2005), Diffusion of innovations; Fifth Edition, New York: Free 
Press. 
Shenon, Philip (2008), ‘Justice Dept. approves XM merger with Sirius’, New York Times, 
25 March 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/business/25radio.html . 
Siepman, Charles (1946), Radio’s second chance, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
Stavitsky, Alan G. (1994), ‘The changing conception of localism in U.S. public radio’, 
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 38, pp. 19-34. 
Sterling, Christopher H. and John M. Kittross (2002), Stay tuned: A history of American 
broadcasting, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996), 47 C.F.R. § 151 et seq. 
Winston, Brian (1998), Media technology and society. New York: Routledge. 
 24 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
i
 Personal communication from Skip Pizzi, 11 May 2009. 
 
ii
 “The 'HD' in 'HD Radio' does not mean 'high-definition' or 'hybrid digital'.  It is part of 
iBiquity's brand for its digital radio technology” (iBiquity 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
